Computers and their ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’

August 18, 2026

Informational computing has always had a mystifying aspect that practitioners and theoreticians did not ignore. The textbook for the classic theoretical computing course at MIT, “Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs”, opens with these words:

“People create programs to direct processes. In effect, we conjure the spirits of the computer with our spells. A computational process is indeed much like a sorcerer’s idea of a spirit. It cannot be seen or touched. It is not composed of matter at all. However, it is very real. It can perform intellectual work. It can answer questions. It can affect the world by disbursing money at a bank or by controlling a robot arm in a factory. The programs we use to conjure processes are like a sorcerer’s spells. They are carefully composed from symbolic expressions in arcane and esoteric programming languages that prescribe the tasks we want our processes to perform” (Abelson and Sussman, SICP, Preface).

To illustrate the point, professor Sussman jokingly gave the lectures using a genie’s hat, making clear that programming is not a menial task, but rather, a work of magic. Magic is a familiar bridge to our experiences of new technologies. Modern systems of information are so complex that, even for trained professionals, the reason why some action works the way it does often remains hidden under words that deflect from its content: the arrow of the function f(x) -> y hides a whole universe of physical and spiritual operations under an abstraction; the differences between radically different systems are leveled by a transparent execution; the division of responsibilities for different applications in an architecture imposes the consideration of whole systems as black boxes. Programming, from the start, is the synthetic construction of a body of knowledge using algorithms and data structures for representing real entities; theory building, in the language of Peter Naur. But just like religion, economics, and any other sort of “reflex of the real world” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, ch. 1, §4), it has the inescapable recognition of its negative, the infinite known unknowns and unknown unknowns.

The programmer chooses to separate parts of the implementation, of algorithms and data structures, to not contemplate, by reasons of safety and efficiency. Cryptography is the perfect example: while it is possible to invent from scratch and to write by hand hypercomplex algorithms for hashing and encryption, it is common knowledge in the software industry that that is a bad idea, and it’s better to use any of the industry standard algorithms freely available for every programming language out there. LLM-based artificial intelligence, this decade’s trend, adds a new dimension to this problem space, as the unknowns are hidden behind blackout blinds, through which it is impossible to gaze: the autonomy of a Large Language Model to make connections in its “neural network” means its beliefs, decisions and other mental qualities cannot be known, even if we so desire. The system is completely opaque, and the only things we have access to are its outputs. In the Faustian contract of traditional programming, in which data structures and algorithms are written by the programmer, he or she still retains a position of control over the machine. The advent of artificial intelligence takes Marx’s analysis of the worker in the factory, made “an appendage of the machine” (Marx, Communist Manifesto, ch. 1), and, from a philosophical reflection on a historical process, turns it into a naturalist painting of concrete reality.

There is an implicit admission in the figure of speech employed by the computer science professors, the analogy between computer programs and magical spells. Magic, a phenomenon common sense understands as belonging to the prehistory of humanity, or to the Dark Ages before the Copernican Revolution, does not simply disappear with the advent of the modern era, erased by scientific rationalism. Rather, it goes through a dialectical éclosion, where some of its ritualistic, animistic aspects are shed, while other substantive aspects are preserved: the appeal to a higher truth, the dogmatism of established knowledge, the hypostatisation of empirical investigation into a general method. It is from magic and the capacity of metaphysical representation to gain objective autonomy that Marx derives the concept of fetishism. Fetishism works as an analytical key for a plethora of social dynamics in which appearance (Erscheinung) conceals the essence (Wesen) of things, by means of a sort of mystic transubstantiation of the object, that acquires qualities that have nothing to do with its own concept. It makes things sound less like man-made objects and more like medieval holy relics. We should take care, however, to not pay excessive attention to this magical, fantastic aspect, lest we evoke the demon by calling its name, and end up as victims to a sort of fetishism of fetishism. It is much less important to apprehend in the objects of our experience the chimera of a supernatural character, than using this idea as a tool with which to expose real fractures in social dynamics, immanent contradictions in the rational development of the capitalist system.

In the critique of political economy, for instance, it is not simply the magical power to enchant the masses of consumers, through tricks of illusionism like branding, advertisement and addictive substances, that Marx’s analysis of the fetishism of commodities intends to reveal. Rather, as a starting point of his investigation of the systemic functioning of capitalist production and circulation of commodities, he points out that these products of human labor are perceived as having an innate attribute, value, which we comprehend as a constitutive quality of the thing itself. A shard of wood can, through the worship of the masses, produce miracles, and no chemical examination will disprove this power. Likewise, under the fetishism of value, it is hard to dispel the mist that hides the social relations and productive forces necessary to the production of commodities.

“A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour… There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, ch. 1, §4).

Let us shed light on the question with a different example, one that makes this idea of transubstantiation very obvious. The advent of new forces of imperial power and violent disputes for territorial dominion resurrected from the time of the Cold War a political discourse marked by a belief in the spiritual powers of the nuclear bomb. This technological artifact’s immense destructive power to produce megatons of atomic discharge has the effect of acting as a deterrent of aggression on the global stage, as no country would (we see in the news that this logic is not flawless) take action against another in possession of an atomic bomb, as that would risk total human annihilation, or mutually assured destruction. Based on this use value as a “destroyer of worlds”, the atomic bomb acquires in the sphere of circulation an exchange value as a currency of power (cf. Harrington, Nuclear Weapons) to purchase political influence and national safety. The fetishism of power leads to an absurd impulse to accumulate this currency that takes on a life of its own, and defeats its own purported intention of guaranteeing peace.

It will be noticed that an important aspect of fetishistic thought is the logical fallacy of causal reversion, where the points of arrival of the analysis are taken as the points of departure, and vice versa: “so soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, ch. 1, §4). This is patent in Marx’s critique of “vulgar” economy (Vulgärökonomie) as corollary of his analysis of the fetishism of value. The metamorphosis of social relations into objective qualities enables the writing of post-hoc laws based on exchange value reified as a thing in itself. Instead of basing the analysis of the wealth of society starting from the manner in which the production of artifacts is organized, viz. the social relations of production and the productive forces through which rough matter is extracted from the earth and transformed into useful goods, the analysis of the later marginalist economists, Jevons, Menger and Walras, takes the commodity as given, ready for sale, and from its behaviour in the free trade, it is possible to derive the “market laws”. These determine, in the balance of supply and demand, the prices of commodities, the wages and profits, which in turn determine the volume of production in the next cycle. The price, a contingent apparition of the value of the commodity in the market, is taken as having analytical precedence over the necessary components of production and circulation, namely, labor and capital.

“Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are artificial institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this, they resemble the theologians, who likewise establish two kinds of religion. (Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 1847, p. 113, quoted in Capital, Vol. I, ch. 1, §4, note 33)”.

In computer technology, from its origins as an industry to its latest incarnations, Big Tech (2010s) and Artificial Intelligence (2020s), we also see something claimed to possess spiritual attributes that far exceed its material content. Computer programs appear to us as having a wonderful capacity to, by themselves, solve problems, rebuild the old structures and transform society for the better. “Solutionism” is a term that describes this fetishism of innovation: “problems are to be dealt with via apps, sensors, and feedback loops – all provided by startups” (Morozov). Systems design substitutes politics as the sphere of mediation of conflicting interests in society: social demands can be satisfied by the development and distribution of an increasing number of programs and devices that solve individual everyday problems, and a network where people are allowed to connect, request, consume.

This attribution of a power of agency to programs and artifacts deeply influences the way we understand the recent changes in social dynamics. For example, the platformization of all aspects of life, e.g. grocery shopping, art and entertainment, love and sex, is perceived as a behavioral change effected by our handheld devices. In the sphere of work, in turn, the phenomenon of the disappearance of the work shift, and the growing trend of people always on the clock, available for work from home, or even from commute, appears also as enabled by the handheld connectivity to the global network. It seems as if the smartphones, inanimate bricks of plastic and metal, did this by themselves, and we humans were defenseless prey to their schemes.

This framing of problems, by affirming that devices can by themselves determine the way we live, does away with all references to political and economic disruptions in the concrete conditions of life. But we can put the thing back on its feet by negating this inverted logic.

Platforms that provide online services, such as remote medical appointments through video calls, and courses through video lectures, don’t simply win space in the market because the UI is intuitive and it’s more practical to do things from the computer. The privatization of essential services, such as health and education, and cuts to government programs for energy and housing, through the dismantling of the welfare state starting in the 1970s, allowed financial monopolies and big tech corporations to take over these industries and profit with the online sale of the basic necessities of life in civilized society. 
Social media and dating apps provide a digital space for socialization where completely new laws and algorithms influence the motion of the affectūs: e.g. the desire for followers, the uninterrupted broadcast of routine, and the social health checks of likes. But none of this can happen without the ruin of communal life that births the absolute digital society (cf. Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft); a historical process advanced by the closing of public spaces for noncommercial activities. The practice of sports is increasingly expensive in the cities. Prices for cultural events such as concerts and sports matches are prohibitive for the poor. Even stepping outside is expensive, and there isn’t anything to do except shopping. In such an environment, there are fewer opportunities to meet people, to talk about life and grow healthy relationships.
Tech startups and hardware manufacturers have grown massively in the last decade, not just due to the financial market speculation and the expected profitability of digital products. The destruction of worker unions that strengthened the labor class in their demands for increased wages allowed a gigantic accumulation of wealth for the capitalist class. This, in turn, is invested in scientific research and computer infrastructure to create tools for automation and replacement of the work force. “The very potential for the expansion of disposable labor time (leisure) due to automation, Marx explained in his day, contradicts capital’s incessant need to expand surplus labor time. The system therefore seeks to promote, by way of automation—based on the leverage provided by an expanding industrial reserve army—the increased degradation and material dependence of labor” (Foster, “The Fetishism of AI”).

Then, there is the question of security. It is acknowledged that, according to the Marxist analysis of capitalism, the concentration of wealth in a small portion of the population (for which concrete data can be verified in the World Inequality Database) is a necessary effect of the cycle of accumulation of capital. In the system working as it is supposed to, impoverishment of a big portion of society functions as a social mechanism for reducing wages and increasing profits (cf. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, ch. 25). This reveals an innate contradiction in all policies for fighting crime: any effective long-term policy to reduce crime should also fight poverty, something to which there is no economic incentive in this system. This does not prevent the tech industry, through its mania for innovation, from taking this as an opportunity to capitalize, by selling products for solving the problems of violence and crime. The huge volume of data and the speed of transmission enable the creation of advanced surveillance systems: cameras in all environments, registries of locomotion of all people, all day long. Such systems are perceived as endowed with a special quality, the efficacy in solving and preventing the occurrence of crimes, through profiling, data crossing, and statistical prediction. “As Oracle CEO Larry Ellison has said, these technologies allow for tracking and targeting everyone all the time. ‘Citizens will be on their best behavior, because we’re constantly recording and reporting everything that’s going on. And it’s unimpeachable…because AI is monitoring the video’” (Foster, op. cit.). This proposal fails to take into account the socioeconomic factors at the root of urban criminality, and how poverty and disenfranchisement are main drivers of increase of levels of violence. Fetishistic solutionism is a treatment that acts on the symptoms, but never at the causes of the disease.

As it happens with commodities and their exchange value represented by money, so does computing bring forth new currencies of innovation to the market. Data, abstract units for the representation of social phenomena, and tokens, abstract units of human language and cognition, are uprooted from the soil of political and economic reality, to constitute an autonomous objective existence, measured in terabytes in the cloud. Social relations between men, those who study and teach the science of computer programs, who write code, who manufacture and maintain hardware, appear in the form of relations between things, apps, bots, and clouds. This appearance brushes away the concrete historical and material process through which these things are brought forth, full of unresolved contradictions. By covering the political and economic contents of society under the cloak of fetishism, we lose sight of the real issue (Sache). The real transformation should be directed at “who controls the economy and whether regular people have a say in the decisions that affect them” (Taylor and Levin). Be they commodities, nuclear bombs, or computers, we cannot put faith in the magical power of artifacts to shape our world in a way that will solve problems that are, in truth, in the heart of society; a society made by, of and for humans, and therefore capable of change.

Further reading